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Abstract
In this article ideas from Kit Fine’s theory of arbitrary objects are ap-
plied to questions regarding mathematical structuralism. I discuss
how sui generis mathematical structures can be viewed as generic
systems ofmathematical objects, wheremathematical objects are con-
ceived of as arbitrary objects in Fine’s sense.
1 What are mathematical theories about?
Many philosophers today consider mathematical structures to be the sub-
ject matter of mathematics. On the one hand there is sui generis or non-
eliminative structuralism. According to sui generis structuralism, the sub-
ject matter of a mathematical theory is a mathematical structure or a family
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ofmathematical structures, wheremathematical structures are understood
to be abstract universals. On the other hand there is eliminative structural-
ism, which is not wedded to abstract universals.
Inspired by work of Fine, I explore in this article a new answer to
the question what mathematical structures are. My account makes use
of elements of Fine’s theory of arbitrary or generic objects [Fine 1983],
[Fine 1985], and extends this to a theory of arbitrary or generic systems
of objects [Fine 1998]. Thus it combines elements of object-Platonism with
elements of structure-Platonism.
Following a tradition in the discussion of structuralism in the philoso-
phy of mathematics, I take the distinction between algebraicmathematical
theories (such as group theory) and non-algebraic mathematical theories
(such as arithmetic) to be important in this context. On the proposed ac-
count, a non-algebraic mathematical theory is about arbitrary (or generic)
objects. These arbitrary objects are abstract, and they form an abstract struc-
ture, which is a generic system of arbitrary objects. An algebraic theory, in
contrast, describes not one single structure but about a family of structures,
where again a structure is understood as a generic system of objects.
I proceed as follows. First, I state my reasons for being dissatisfied
with existing versions of both non-eliminative and eliminative structural-
ism (section 2). Next, I discuss Kit Fine’s theory of arbitrary objects and
how it can be extended to a theory of generic systems (section 3, section
4) and to an interpretation of the theory of pure sets (section 5). This will
lead to a new account of the nature of mathematical structures; I will ex-
plain in some philosophical detail what this position amounts to (section
6). Before closing, I compare my position with rival accounts (section 7).
2 Mathematical structuralism
Adistinction is drawn between eliminative structuralism and non-eliminative
structuralism [Shapiro 1996, p. 81]. Non-eliminative and eliminative struc-
turalists agree that different systems of concrete objects can have a struc-
ture in common. But Platonistic structuralism maintains that such mathe-
matical structures exist independently of the systems that instantiate them;
eliminative structuralists regard talk of mathematical structures as loose
talk that can ultimately be replaced by talk about systems being isomor-
phic to each other.
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Another distinction can be drawn between algebraic and non-algebraic
mathematical theories [Shapiro 1997, p. 40–41]. Intuitively, an algebraic
theory is one that is intended to be about many different structures. A
non-algebraic theory, in contrast, intends to describe one structure only.
Eliminative structuralists hold that every mathematical theory, alge-
braic or non-algebraic, is about a multiplicity of systems of objects. The
non-eliminative structuralist can only partly agree with this thesis of dis-
tributed reference for mathematical theories. She agrees with the elimi-
native structuralist that algebraic theories are about many structures. But
she insists that the distributed reference hypothesis does not hold for non-
algebraic theories and claims to have evidence for this: we speak of “the
natural number structure”. Non-algebraic theories are about a unique sub-
ject matter: the subject matter of a non-algebraic theory is the unique struc-
ture that it purports to describe.1
Eliminative structuralism comes in many flavours. One popular vari-
ant is set theoretic structuralism, which takes the structures that amathemat-
ical theory is about to be sets endowed with operations [Mayberry 1994].
But this assumes a form of set-theoretic reductionism that many today find
hard to accept. Eliminative structuralism does not have to take structures
to be sets. She can, for instance, take structures to be physical arrange-
ments (“pluralities”) of objects that stand in specific physical relations to
each other. But this is taking mathematical structures to be physical in na-
ture, which is is another form of reductionism that is hard to accept. I will
not pursue this debate here.
More importantly for present purposes, according to eliminative struc-
turalism there is no sense in which even non-algebraic theories can be
said to be about mathematical objects. But mathematical theories are about
mathematical objects [Parsons 2008, p. 1]:
The language of mathematics speaks of objects. This is a rather
trivial statement; it is not clear that we can conceive any devel-
oped language that does not. What is of interest is that, taken
at face value, mathematical language speaks of objects distinc-
tively mathematical in character: numbers, functions, sets, ge-
ometric figures, and the like. To begin with, they are distinctive
in being abstract.
1In more recent work, Shapiro questions whether non-eliminative structuralism
should commit itself to this unique reference thesis: see [Shapiro 2006, p. 243].
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Existing forms of non-eliminative structuralism cannot be chargedwith
implausible reductionist claims. Moreover, according to non-eliminative
forms of mathematical structuralism, non-algebraic theories can be taken
to be about objects. Consider Shapiro’s version of non-eliminative struc-
turalism [Shapiro 1997]. On this view, a mathematical structure contains
places or roles that can be occupied by objects. Nonetheless, the places
themselves can be viewed as objects that can be organised into a system
that instantiates the structure [Shapiro 1997, p. 100–101].
However, at this point the non-eliminative structuralist is faced with
two problems.
First, the objects that populate sui generis structures are according to
non-eliminative structuralism in some sense incomplete. A rough state-
ment of what is intended (when applied to arithmetic) is to say that num-
bers only have structural properties [Shapiro 1997, p. 72–73]. However, it
has turned out to be very difficult to make the intended meaning of such
statement sufficiently precise in a way that does not lead to counterex-
amples.2 Shapiro has also come to recognise that it is difficult to give a
satisfactory philosophical account of the incompleteness of mathematical
objects [Shapiro 2006, section 1]. For instance, the number 7 might have
the property of being my least favourite number, even though this is not a
‘structural’ property.
Secondly, as Hellman points out [Hellman 2006, p. 546], Shapiro’s view
is vulnerable to a permutation objection. If, in the ante rem structure N of the
natural numbers, we permute its places (in a non-trivial way), then we
obtain a system N′ that is isomorphic to N. We can then ask, in the spirit
of [Benacerraf 1965]: what could possibly make N, rather than N′ be the
unique sui generis structure that arithmetic is about?
The aim of this article is to articulate and explore a new position ac-
cording to which mathematical theories are not only about structures but
also about objects. So it cannot be a form of eliminative structuralism. The
position to be developed is expected to attribute the ‘right’ kind of incom-
pleteness to natural numbers, and should not be vulnerable to the permu-
tation objection.
2See [Linnebo & Pettigrew 2014] and [Korbmacher & Schiemer forthc.].
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3 Arbitrary objects
A theory of arbitrary objects was developed in [Fine 1983] and [Fine 1985].
I will now briefly and informally review some the main tenets of this the-
ory.3
Consider any category of entities. It is helpful to fix (without essential
loss of generality) on some particular kind of mathematical objects: the
natural numbers, say. There are specific natural numbers, such as the num-
ber 23. But beside specific natural numbers, there are also arbitrary natural
numbers. An arbitrary number is what a mathematician refers to when
she says: “Let m be a natural number. . . ”,4 and then goes on to reason
about m.
There aremany arbitrary natural numbers. For instance, it wouldmake
perfect sense for our mathematician, in the course of her argument, to add
“Now let n be an other natural number. . . ”, and go on reasoning about
both m and n.
In general, an arbitrary natural number does not determinately have
any specific natural number as its value. There is no determinate matter
of fact, for instance, about whether the value of our mathematician’s arbi-
trary number m is 23.5
There can be a determinate fact about whether an arbitrary number x
is numerically identical with an arbitrary number y. Our mathematician
was perfectly within her rights when she required the arbitrary numbersm
and n to be non-identical. She might just have said, more clearly perhaps:
“take any two arbitrary numbers m and n such that m 6= n, . . .”
When an arbitrary natural number does not determinately have some
given specific number as its value, there is a sense in which it can be the
specific number in question. Thus we can say that arbitrary numbers can
be in different specific states. These possible situations (states) may be un-
derstood in a Lewisian realist way, but one can also understand talk about
states in a Kripkean, deflationist way. (I will not take a stance on this mat-
ter.)
There is, however, no actual specific state in which the arbitrary number
is. The best we can say, perhaps, is that an arbitrary number “actually” is
3In what follows, I may be guilty of adding a few tenets of my own to Fine’s theory.
4This is denied by [Breckenridge & Magidor 2012]: see section 7.3 below.
5Again, [Breckenridge & Magidor 2012] deny this.
5
in a “superposition” of specific states.
There are degrees of arbitrariness. If our mathematician says “Let m be
an arbitrary natural number larger than 10”, then she refers to a number
that is less arbitrary than when she says “Let m be an arbitrary natural
number larger than 5”. So one might say that a natural number is com-
pletely arbitrary if it can be any specific natural number whatsoever. In
some sense, specific natural numbers are closely related to limiting cases
of arbitrary natural numbers. For many purposes they can be identified
with arbitrary natural numbers that have an absolutely minimal degree of
arbitrariness. But it is important to see that, strictly speaking, no arbitrary
number is identical to any specific number. An arbitrary number is the
sort of thing that can be in a state, whereas a specific number cannot be in
a state.
Since a completely arbitrary natural number can be in any specific
state whatsoever, a completely arbitrary natural number has only those
‘specific’ (Fine calls them ‘classical’) properties that every specific natural
number has. Let us call this Fine’s principle. It is not a simple matter to spell
out precisely what ‘specific’ properties are,6 and I will not attempt to do so
here. But self-identity is one such specific property of the completely arbi-
trary number m above, whilst “possibly being identical with the arbitrary
number n (above)” isn’t.
An arbitrary number can be more or less likely to be in a given state.
For instance, an arbitrary natural number between 25 and 50 is unlikely to
be a power of 2.7
The concept of arbitrary object has only played a marginal role in phi-
losophy. There are two reasons for this. First, arguments have been put
forward that purport to show that it is philosophically untenable to main-
tain that there are arbitrary objects [Frege 1979, p. 160]. Second, it has
been argued that the concept of arbitrary object cannot be put to good use.
For instance, Russell’s doctrine of incomplete symbols shows how it is not
necessary to take the phrase “the man in the street” to be a denoting term
6Fine recognises that it is difficult to give a precise description of the distinction be-
tween ‘classical’ and ‘generic’ conditions [Fine 1985, chapter 1]. For a discussion of this
distinction, see [Breckenridge & Magidor 2012, section 2.1.3].
7Fine does not connect, as I do, the concept of arbitrary object with a concept of prob-
ability. Since the relevant probability functions should be uniform distributions on an in-
finite space, it might be appropriate to appeal to techniques of [Benci et al 2013] to model
them. However, I leave this discussion for another occasion.
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referring to some ‘arbitrary man’. Fine intended to counter both of these
arguments.
Fine sought to defuse the first objection by articulating a coherent and
natural concept of arbitrary object. I assume for the purposes of the dis-
cussion that he was successful in this enterprise.
Fine countered the second objection in a double movement. On the
one hand, he gestured at a number of other applications for the concept
of arbitrary object, such as the theory of infinitesimals, the notion of forc-
ing in set theory,. . . 8 On the other hand, he worked out two applications
in detail. First, he formulated a natural semantics for first-order logic in
terms of the notion of arbitrary object [Fine 1985]. Second, he discussed in
detail how a theory of Cantorian (and Dedekindean) abstraction could be
developed based on the theory of arbitrary objects [Fine 1998].
Russell showed that many uses of arbitrary objects are non-essential:
much talk involving arbitrary objects can be adequately paraphrased in
ways that do not involve them. A somewhat similar point can be made
about Fine’s use of arbitrary objects in his new semantics for first-order
logic. The silence with which his effort seems to have been met9 is due to
the fact that we have perfectly adequate semantics for first-order logic that
do not involve arbitrary objects.10
Fine’s account of Cantorian abstraction, however, does strike me as a
use of the theory of arbitrary objects that is much harder to dismiss as
philosophically redundant. Moreover, Fine himself observed that this ac-
count can be extended to form the basis of a new form of mathematical
structuralism for non-algebraic mathematical theories. A primary aim of
the present article is to explore the ramifications of Fine’s brief but sugges-
tive remarks in section VI of [Fine 1998] on these matters in some depth,
not only for the interpretation of non-algebraic but also for the interpre-
tation of algebraic theories. My account will diverge in key points from
the way in which Fine thought that this new form of structuralism should
look like. I will point out where this is the case, and I will state my reasons
for developing it in a different way.
8As far as I know, these potential applications have not yet been worked out in detail.
9An exception to this is [King 1991].
10The situation is somewhat similar, in this respect, to theories of the mathematical
continuum that involve infinitesimals.
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4 Generic systems
Generic systems can be seen as a special kind of arbitrary entities. My ac-
count of generic systems is intended to be completely general. In order to
illustrate how it works for particular mathematical theories, I will concen-
trate on one non-algebraic theory (arithmetic), and one algebraic theory
(graph theory).
I take what I am doing to be an exercise in naive metaphysics in the sense
of [Fine 2017]. That is, I investigate the nature of generic systems. As a tool
in this investigation, I explore in this section how some generic systems
can best be modelled in set theory. The purpose of this is to discern meta-
physical properties of generic systems. For instance, a set theoretic way
of modelling a generic system will give an answer to questions such as:
How is a generic system incomplete? How many objects does it contain?
What kinds of things are the states? In how many states can this generic
system be? Such answers are only as good as the set theoretic model is
at representing fundamental properties of the generic system in question.
But generic systems, like Fine’s arbitrary objects, constitute a metaphysi-
cal realm in their own right: far be it from me to advocate an ontological
reduction of generic systems to sets.
4.1 Maximally arbitrary ω-sequences
Suppose that the physical world around us consists of a countably infinite
collection A of objects, which we may label as a0, a1, a2 . . .
Consider all ways in which this collection can be ordered as an ω-
sequence. Mathematically, this amounts to considering all functions from
N to A. Let us write down all such functions in a long list L. It is clear that
this list has 2ℵ0 entries: let pα (for every α < 2
ℵ0) be line α in this long list
L.
The entries in this long list (i.e., the pα’s) constitute all the possible spe-
cific ω-sequences in the physical world that we are considering. Thus the
pα’s can be seen as exhausting the possible states that a generic ω-sequence
can be in.
The possible state space should be sufficiently large to accommodate
every possible specific state. But there seems no reason to assume that
it is larger. So we propose that the pα’s are labels for the possible states.
Then we can take the list L to give the possible state profile of an arbitrary
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ω-sequence. The state profile of a generic ω-sequence is all we care about,
so we may for modelling purposes take the list L to be an arbitrary ω-
sequence.
Of course there are infinitely many other such lists of order type 2ℵ0 —
there are in fact 22
ℵ0 of them. We take each of them to specify the state profile
of some arbitrary ω-sequence, or, in brief, to be an arbitrary ω-sequence.
The list L is a maximally arbitrary ω-sequence. A much less arbitrary
ω-sequence is given by a list (of cardinality 2ℵ0) of functions from N to
A almost all of which are identical to some particular function f . This
arbitrary ω-sequence is then overwhelmingly likely to be the specific ω-
sequence f . And specific ω-sequences can then be seen as canonically
embedded in the arbitrary ω-sequences. They are embedded as the lists
that have the same ω-sequence on each row.
Generic systems consist of arbitrary objects. Generic ω-sequences con-
sist of arbitrary natural numbers. To see how this works, consider again
our long list L. An arbitrary natural number is a thread or fiber through L,
i.e., formally, a function from 2ℵ0 to A. So there are 22
ℵ0 arbitrary natu-
ral numbers in L. Elementary arithmetical operations on arbitrary natural
numbers are defined pointwise. Take the sum a+ b of the arbitrary num-
bers a and b, for instance. This is the arbitrary number that in each state
w takes the value of the sum of the value of a at w and the value of b at
w according to the state (ω-sequence) w. Elementary operations can then
straightforwardly be seen to satisfy the familiar properties of arithmetical
operations (such as commutativity of +, for instance).11
4.2 The generic countable graph
Let us do this also for countable simple graphs, and let us do it in the same
way. Informally it is clear what we should do, but, for definiteness, let us
see in detail how it goes.
Suppose we are given a countable vertex set V = v0, v1, v2, . . . We want
to list all possible particular graphs on subsets of V.
A graph consists of vertices and edges. Edges are often seen as un-
ordered pairs of vertices. But in the framework of multisets, vertices them-
selves can be seen as special cases of edges. So let us take this perspec-
11The mathematical properties of the generic ω-sequence are investigated in
[Horsten & Speranski 2018].
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tive. Let an edge between two vertices vi and vj be given as the unordered
(multi-)pair {vi, vj}. And let a vertex vi be given as the multipair {vi, vi}.
We order the unordered multi-pairs of elements of V in lexicographical
fashion, i.e., when i ≤ j and i′ ≤ j′, we say that
{vi, vj} < {vi′ , vj′} if and only if i < i
′ or (i = i′ and j < j′).
Then a graph G is given by a countable list of unordered multi-pairs, with-
out repetitions, well-ordered by <, where we adopt the convention that if
{vi, vj} appears in the list, the multipairs {vi, vi} and {vj, vj} must also
belong to the list.
Consider a list L∗ of such graphs which contains every particular graph
on V exactly once. This list will again be of length 2ℵ0 . The list L∗ gives the
state profile of a maximally arbitrary countable graph on V, where a row in
L∗ describes a specific state that this graph can be in. So we can take it, for
modelling purposes, to be a maximally arbitrary countable graph. There
are 22
ℵ0 such lists, i.e., generic countable graphs on V.
Generic graphs then consist of arbitrary edges. An arbitrary edge of
the arbitrary graph L∗ is a thread through L∗. So there are 22
ℵ0 arbitrary
edges in L∗.
Some generic graphs are less arbitrary than others. There are lists of
graphs (of length 2ℵ0) that list the same particular graph on almost all of
their rows. Such arbitrary graphs are overwhelmingly likely to be one
particular graph. And there are generic graphs that list the same specific
graph on each of its rows, so particular graphs are canonically embedded
as limiting cases of generic graphs.
A celebrated theorem from countable graph theory (by Erdo¨s & Renyi,
1963) says that there exists a simple graph R with the following property
[Cameron 2013]. If a countable graph is chosen at random, by selecting
edges independently with probability 12 from the set of two-element sub-
sets of the vertex set, then almost surely (i.e., with probability 1), the re-
sulting graph is isomorphic to R. This graph R is called the Rado graph.
In the present context, this theorem can be taken to say that with proba-
bility 1, the generic countable graph L∗ is the Rado graph. Thus Erdo¨s &
Renyi’s theorem can be seen as a probabilistic categoricity theorem for count-
able graph theory.
We could now do the same for some other algebraic theory, such as
countable group theory for instance. We would then take a particular
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countable group to be given by its multiplication table, and take a generic
countable group to be given by a long list of particular countable groups.
We could also move from countable mathematics to uncountable mathe-
matics, by considering the theory of the real numbers for instance. But the
general procedure is clear, so there is no need to go into details here.
5 Sets and arbitrary objects
Nothing has yet been said about the nature of the objects of the underlying
domain of generic systems (ω-sequences, graphs, groups): the choice of
the underlying plurality of objects in section 4 was an external parameter
of the model. But this is a question that cannot altogether be avoided.
Nothing in mathematical practice dictates that the underlying objects
should be physical in nature. But clearly many of them are required if
we want to extend the view described in this article beyond countable
mathematics.
The universe of sets contains a sufficient supply of objects for our math-
ematical objects and structures. It might seem ad hoc if the subject matter
of set theory would fall altogether outside the scope of the theory of math-
ematical structures.
If we admit higher order arbitrary objects, then the theory of arbitrary
objects provides the resources for giving a natural explication of what an
iterative hierarchy of set theoretic ranks may be taken to consist of. A
metaphysical account of how this might work goes along the following
lines:
• Stage 0
We take some specific object o to be given.
• Stage 1
Now consider the arbitrary object which can only be in the state of
being the specific object o; we denote this arbitrary object as 〈o〉.
Then o 6= 〈o〉: unlike an arbitrary object, a specific object is not the
sort of entity that can be in states.
• Stage 2
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(2a) Consider the higher-order arbitrary object that can only be in
the state of being the arbitrary object 〈o〉. Denote this higher-order
arbitrary object as 〈〈o〉〉.
(2b) Consider an higher-order arbitrary object that can only be in one
of the following two states: being the specific object o, or being the
arbitrary object 〈o〉. Denote this object as 〈o, 〈o〉〉.
• Stage ω
Collect the arbitrary objects that have been generated in the finite
stages.
• Later stages
Continue in this way into the transfinite.
In this way, a hierarchy of higher-order arbitrary objects, based on one
specific object, is built up. The simple idea of course is to view arbitrary
objects as (non-empty) sets, and their states as their elements. This leaves
the specific object on which the hierarchy is based, which is not the sort of
thing that can be in states, playing the role of the empty set. So we read
the pointy brackets 〈. . .〉 as curly brackets {. . .}, and o as ∅. For example,
the set {∅, {∅}} is the arbitrary object which can be specific object o, but
which can also be the arbitrary object which can only be the specific object
o.
Let us call this the generic hierarchy. The concept that it might perhaps be
taken to capture is the combinatorial set concept, which takes a set of X-es
to be the result of an arbitrary selection process.
The construction of the generic hierarchy makes use of a notion of
higher order arbitrariness, which in turn requires taking arbitrary objects
ontologically very seriously. So this is a decidedly Platonistic interpreta-
tion of set theory.
We have seen how the distinction between a and 〈a〉 corresponds to
the distinction between a set and its singleton. It is not clear whether this
metaphysical account gives an adequate explanation of what Lewis has
dubbed the “mystery of the singleton relation” [Lewis 1991]. Some may
worry that the distinction between a specific object and the arbitrary object
that can only ever be in the state of being that specific object is no better
motivated than the relation between an object and its singleton.
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An important observation is that the generic hierarchy is the result of
an extreme flattening or extensionalisation of what is at bottom a much
more intensional notion of set. There are, for example, in fact two higher
order arbitrary objects that can play the role of the set {∅, {∅}} in stage
(2b). These two arbitrary objects are anti-correlated; if one of them is in the
state of being o, then the other is in the state of being 〈o〉 and vice versa. (So
one might denote these two objects as 〈o, 〈o〉〉 and 〈〈o〉, o〉, respectively.)
The engine of the iterative hierarchy of sets is the full power set opera-
tion. This operation drops out naturally in the framework of the theory of
arbitrary objects: the description of stages shows how at every stage α + 1,
there are 2α arbitrary objects that naturally represent all the subsets of the
domain of sets that exist at stage α.12
6 What mathematical theories are about
Let us now connect the discussion of generic systems to the question of
the subject matter of mathematical theories.
6.1 Non-algebraic theories
In the setting of arbitrary objects and systems, sense can be made of the
commonplace statement that arithmetic is about the natural numbers. In
fact, there are two different ways in which this can be made more precise.
One might say that arithmetic is about all specific natural numbers, where
specific numbers are arbitrary objects as described in section 4.1. Alterna-
tively, one might say that arithmetic is about arbitrary natural numbers.13
But in either case, arithmetic is said to be about objects of an abstract kind,
in accordance with object-focussed forms of mathematical Platonism such
as Go¨del’s. I will not try to decide here whether it is more natural to say
that arithmetic is about arbitrary natural numbers or about specific natural
numbers.
As an illustration, consider Goldbach’s conjecture, which says:
12I do not claim that the present account has much new to say about the motivation of
some of the other powerful axioms of standard set theory such as Infinity or Replacement.
13The form of structuralism sketched in [Fine 1998, section 6] takes arithmetic to be
about the specific natural numbers rather than about the specific and the arbitrary natural
numbers.
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Take any even natural number larger than 2;
it is the sum of two prime numbers.
Two possible readings are:
1. Take any specific even natural number n; then n is the sum of two
(specific) primes.
2. Take any arbitrary even natural number n; then n is the sum of two
(arbitrary) primes.
From the point of view of our set theoretic model, the arbitrary natural
numbers are located (as threads) in a large structure: the collection of all
ω-sequence orderings of our countable collection A. So there is a sense in
which arithmetic can be said to be about the generic ω-sequence.
The generic ω-sequence can be interpreted in a sui generismanner. Al-
ternatively, one can ‘deflate’ the generic ω-sequence in an eliminative way
as supervening on concrete ω-sequences. But then one cannot take arbi-
trary objects (i.e., specific and arbitrary numbers) to exist as completed
abstract entities, and that would mean that arithmetic is not about math-
ematical objects. So generic ω-sequences are to be understood in a non-
eliminative way.
We have seen in section 4.1 that there are, from a higher-order point
of view, many (completely) arbitrary ω-sequences, which can be obtained
from each other by permutations of the list L. But from within arithmetic
as an independent and self-standing discipline there is only one generic ω-
sequence. All attempts to ‘construct’ other ones are, from the point of view
of arithmetic itself, mere re-labelings of the one and only completely arbi-
trary ω-sequence. So from this point of view, our mathematical modelling
of the generic ω-sequences as a list contains excess structure. Therefore a
better way of modelling is obtained when an arbitrary number is taken to
be the set
{〈w, a〉 | w is an ω-sequence on A, and a ∈ A},
where A is again the countably infinite set of objects of section 4.1.14
14This is roughly how Fine understands arbitrary natural numbers (see [Fine 1998,
p. 630]), except that I am here giving a set theoretic representation of arbitrary natural
numbers and the structure to which they belong, whereas Fine does not do so. He in-
stead appeals to an intuitively given theory of arbitrary objects and locates the generic
structures and objects in the ontology of such a theory.
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Whether this way of modelling the generic ω-sequence brings out most
of its structural features depends on wider issues in the philosophy of
arithmetic. Some hold that wemust be able to compute on the particular ω-
sequences (states) that instantiate the natural number structure [Halbach & Horsten 2005],
[Horsten 2012]. If that is so, then the states are ‘computable’ ω-sequences,
i.e., recursive permutations of a recursive notation system for the natural
numbers (our system of arabic numerals, for instance, or the stroke nota-
tion system for the natural numbers). On this picture, the generic natural
number structure can only be in ℵ0 many states, and if we go on to define
arbitrary numbers as before, then there will only be 2ℵ0 many of those.
Again, I will not try to adjudicate here which way of modelling the generic
natural number structure is most faithful to its metaphysical nature.
At any rate, the specific natural numbers form a sub-structure of this
larger structure. The specific natural numbers, ordered in the natural way,
of course themselves form an ω-sequence. This ω-sequence is what Fine
regards as “the generic ω-sequence [Fine 1998, p. 618–619].15 This means
that on his view, in contrast to mine, the generic ω-sequence instantiates it-
self [Fine 1998, p. 621]. But that of course leaves the resulting account open
to the permutation objection. Fine himself is well aware of this [Fine 1998,
p. 625], and he defends his account against this charge [Fine 1998, p. 628–
629]. It would take me too far to go into details here, but I find Fine’s ar-
guments in this matter unconvincing. Fine’s reply to the permutation ob-
jection involves, in the final analysis, making somewhat arbitrary choices
and consequently introducing excess structure.
6.2 Algebraic theories
We could say that countable graph theory is about the generic countable
graph as modelled in section 4.2, the realisations of which are concrete
graphs. (And we could recognise again that from a higher-order perspec-
tive, there are many maximally arbitrary countable graphs.) Or, alterna-
tively, we could in a more in rebus vein say that graph theory is about all
particular graphs.
But there are two reasons why saying that countable graph theory is
about the generic countable graph would not fit with mathematical prac-
15Fine does not discuss the further phenomenon that from a higher-order perspective,
there aremany arbitrary ω-sequences.
15
tice. First, this is not howmathematicians talk and think. They do not take
the subject of graph theory to be one privileged structure, but instead take
graph theory to be aboutmany structures. Second, there are graphs that be-
long to the subject matter of countable graph theory but that are not among
the states that the generic countable graph, as described in section 4.2, can
be in. “The unconnected two-element graph”, for instance, is among the
graphs that countable graph theory is about [Leitgeb & Ladyman 2007].
But this is not a concrete system: it is not a particular graph on V.
Nonetheless, there is a natural sense in which it can be said that there
are many arbitrary countable graphs on an underlying countable collec-
tion B. By now it is clear how the story goes: Construct a long repeated list
in which each line enumerates all concrete graphs on B. Then an arbitrary graph
is a thread through this list. Among these arbitrary graphs, there are specific
graphs, such as “the unconnected two-element graph”. Here by a specific
graph I mean a maximally generic system that in one possible state is re-
alised by a particular graph that is isomorphic with every concrete graph
that realises it in any other possible situation. (So, in my terminology, spe-
cific graphs, being generic systems, are not the same as particular graphs
on V, being concrete systems.)
Now it is natural to say —or so I maintain— that countable graph the-
ory is about all arbitrary countable graphs. Alternatively, just as one might
say that number theory is about the specific numbers, it is natural to say
that countable graph theory is about all specific countable graphs. (Notice
that both arbitrary and specific graphs are abstract entities.)
There is a higher-order arbitrary object, the realisations of which are
arbitrary or specific graphs (the latter of which are themselves also arbi-
trary systems). In some diluted sense one might say that countable graph
theory is about this higher-order arbitrary object. But we should not do
so. The reason is that, like the generic countable graph of section 4.2, the
higher-order arbitrary object is not really a structure.
Nonetheless, there are natural structural relations between the higher-
order object and its realisations. If one were to incorporate these structural
relations in the notion of the higher-order object, then one would obtain
a notion that is close to what is called a Lawvere theory [Lawvere 1964],
[Pettigrew 2011]. Indeed, in his doctoral dissertation Lawvere set out to
specify a category that is a generic group (or a generic ring or a generic
field). And that category would be defined in such a way that then any
specific group (or ring or field) can be identified with a functor from that
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generic group (or ring or field) into the category of sets.16
6.3 Generic structures
Mathematical theories are about mathematical structures and their objects.
But what mathematical structures and mathematical objects are, is a diffi-
cult philosophical question.
On the proposed account, mathematical structures are generic systems
and mathematical objects are arbitrary objects.
Generic systems are governed by an instantiation relation (the relation
of being in a state). Therefore my view is a structuralist position in the phi-
losophy of mathematics. Clearly it is a Platonistic form of structuralism.
On the proposed view, mathematical structures are more than mere ab-
stract patterns, to use an expression from [Resnik 1997]. They differ from
Shapiro’s ante rem structures. Fine’s arbitrary objects play an in-eliminable
role in my account, for even specific numbers are arbitrary objects and spe-
cific graphs (or groups or. . . ) are arbitrary systems.
What drivesmy view, andwhat has perhaps not been sufficiently recog-
nised by Shapiro’s places-objects view, is that in the abstractive movement
from system to structure, the notion of object is transformed along with
that of system. The appropriate slogan is: from concrete system to generic
system, and from concrete object to arbitrary object.
I have tried to show how set theoretical models can give us a feeling
of what a generic system such as the generic ω-sequence is like. At the
same time, I insisted that the generic ω-sequence is a sui generis entity that
cannot ontologically be reduced to any pure or impure set.
The previous section contains a sketch of an answer to the question
where the objects out of which the underlying particular ω-sequences are
constructed come from. There is no plausible way, as far as I can see, that
the elements of the underlying plurality of objects can be conjured up, in
neo-logicist vein, out of logical air. They must belong to a realm that has
ontological priority over the generic ω-sequence. This realm can be taken
to be the iterative hierarchy of pure sets. This hierarchy may be thought of
as reduced to the generic hierarchy of section 5, but it can also be thought
16I cannot pursue this relation with Category Theory further here, but I am grateful to
Richard Pettigrew for drawing my attention to the connection.
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of as an alternative that can serve the same purpose as the set theoretic
hierarchy.17
However we think of this, the models in sections 4.1 and 6.1 are over-
simplified: no single countable infinity of sets should be privileged. But
this can easily be taken on board: we just have to make our list L (much)
longer. Take for instance the generic ω-sequence as modelled in section
4.1. Let the entries in our revised list L consist of exactly all the ω-sequence
orderings of all the countably infinite pluralities of pure sets (or elements
of the generic hierarchy), and then proceed as before. A similar story can
of course be told for other generic systems.
The fact remains that the ambient domain is given special treatment: it
is not itself a generic system. It seems to me that this exception can be well
motivated along the lines of [Burgess 2015, p. 144].18 Briefly, the motiva-
tions from mathematical practice for adopting a structuralist position for
particular branches of mathematics (number theory, group theory, analy-
sis, topology,. . . ) just do not seem to extend to foundational theories.
7 Rival accounts
I now turn to a comparison of my view of mathematical structure with
rival accounts of structure and arbitrariness in mathematics. The aim is
not so much to show that my account gives better answers to searching
philosophical questions as to clarify my stance on some of the issues.
7.1 The incompleteness of mathematical objects
It is well-documented that both eliminative and non-eliminative struc-
turalism carry considerable ontological and / ormodal commitments. This
is particularly so for versions of non-eliminative structuralism. The ac-
count that I propose must simply accept such commitments: it is ontolog-
ically committed to the existence of arbitrary objects and generic systems.
So there is no question of avoiding platonistic commitments. Rather, the
question is whether the proposed account gives plausible answers to vex-
ing philosophical problems.
17After all, the track record of ontological reduction in philosophy is not great.
18I should mention that Burgess advocates a form of eliminative rather than non-
eliminative structuralism.
18
Algebraic theories are about classes of structures that themselves form
amore general structure; non-algebraic theories are about particular struc-
tures. Nonetheless, particular structures are in a sense more fundamental
[Isaacson 2011, p. 1–2]:
Mathematical structures are, roughly, of two kinds, particular
(e.g. the natural numbers) and general (e.g. groups). Mathe-
matics for its first several thousand years was concerned only
with particular structures. Modern mathematics is much more
about general structures, but despite this shift, the reality of
mathematics turns ultimately on the reality of particular struc-
tures.
In contrast to Isaacson’s structuralism,19 I take non-algebraic mathe-
matical theories to be not just about structures but also aboutmathematical
objects, and thus aim to be more faithful to how mathematicians unreflec-
tively tend to view such structures. Moreover, my aim is to give a detailed
account of the incompleteness of mathematical objects, and I do so in terms
of the ability of mathematical objects to take on particular values. Indeed,
the description of the way in which mathematical objects are incomplete
forms the heart of the proposed theory of mathematical structure.
Shapiro also takes structures to contain objects since an ante rem struc-
ture can be taken to be a system. But this move results in mathematical
objects not having the right kind of incompleteness, as Hellman’s permu-
tation argument shows.20
The theory of mathematical structure that is advocated in this article
does not succumb to the permutation argument. It is clear that the exact
analogue of the problem that Shapiro faces does not pose itself. A generic
structure is not a state that that same generic structure can be in. Ap-
plied to arithmetic, for instance, this means that the generic ω-sequence
is not itself an ω-sequence. Nonetheless, one may ask, whether this gets
to the heart of the matter.21 Cannot the specific number 0 in the generic
ω-sequence ‘play the role’ of the specific number 1 and vice versa, for in-
stance? But the answer to that question is plainly no: in every state, the
value taken by the specific number 0 plays the 0-role, and the value taken
19I do not have space here to go into the details of Isaacson’s view.
20See section 2 above.
21Thanks to James Studd for pressing the objection.
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by the number 1 plays the 1-role. This is the main reason why I take
my theory of mathematical structure to be preferable over Shapiro’s non-
eliminative structuralism.
7.2 Theories and structures
Nodelman and Zalta have also proposed a form of ante rem structuralism
that is not subject to the permutation objection [Nodelman & Zalta 2014].
I will now briefly discuss their position.
Central to Nodelman and Zalta’s account is a distinction between two
kinds of predication: exemplification and codification. Exemplification is the
form of predication that we are most familiar with. For instance, we have
a case of an ordinary object exemplifying a property when we say that
Vladimir Putin is the president of Russia. But abstract objects can codify
predicates or groups of predicates. For instance, the abstract object redness
codifies the property of being red.
On Nodelman and Zalta’s account, mathematical structures are ob-
tained frommathematical theories, along roughly the following lines. There
is a canonical way of constructing properties out of propositions via λ-
abstraction. A mathematical theory can be identified with the collection of
mathematical propositions that it logically entails. Therefore, a mathemat-
ical theory is associated with the collection of properties constructed out of
the propositions that it entails. And there will be a unique abstract object
that encodes exactly those properties. So we may identify a mathematical
structure with this abstract entity [Nodelman & Zalta 2014, p. 51].
This is an ante rem form of structuralism that differs from the accounts
that we have so far discussed. It associates a unique ante rem structure
even with each algebraic theory, and thus comes closer to the account
that I propose than to Shapiro’s version of non-eliminative structuralism.
Moreover, it aims at attributing exactly the right kind of incompleteness
to mathematical structures. Consider for instance the theory of dense lin-
ear orderings. It will be, on Nodelman and Shapiro’s account, about an
abstract entity (structure) that encodes all the properties of this theory. In
particular, it encodes neither countability or uncountability, since there are
both countable and uncountable dense linear orderings.
Mathematical structures contain mathematical objects, on Nodelman
and Zalta’s account. The objects that a structure contains are extracted
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from the theory from which the structure is obtained. Roughly, objects
correspond to the terms that the theory contains. The object corresponding
to a term of a theory will again be an abstract object that codifies the prop-
erties that the theory attributes to it. Thus the Peano Arithmetic structure
will be, in some sense, about all and only the familiar objects 0, 1, 2, . . . And
this will have as a consequence that there will be no cross-theory identifi-
cation of mathematical objects: the number 0 of Peano Arithmetic will be
distinct from the number 0 of Real Analysis.22
However, since mathematical objects are identified by means of clus-
ters of properties satisfied by the denotation of a term according to a given
theory, there is no room in their account for numerically distinct but strongly
indistinguishable objects [Nodelman & Zalta 2014, p. 73]:
An element of a structure must be uniquely characterizable in
terms of the relations of the structure.
But this is in a tension with ways in which mathematicians tend to speak.
Take for instance the theory of countable dense linear orderings without
endpoints. Intuitively, one would say that any corresponding structure
contains countably many numerically distinct objects that are all indis-
tinguishable from each other. But on Nodelman and Zalta’s theory, the
structure that this theory describes does not contain any objects.
The moral of this is, I think, that there is more to the objects of a struc-
ture than the discriminating powers of our best theory about the structure.
On my account, there is a sense in which even arithmetic is about many
mathematical objects (arbitrary numbers) that are mutually highly indis-
tinguishable from each other.
7.3 Reference and dependence
Recall our mathematician from section 3 who enters the lecture room and
says “Let m be an arbitrary natural number”. What is she referring to?
On Breckenridge & Magidor’s account, she is referring to a specific nat-
ural number but it is in principle impossible for anyone to know which
one [Breckenridge & Magidor 2012]. So any arbitrariness lies on the side
of the reference relation rather than on the side of the objects referred to.
22So on this point Nodelman and Zalta’s account is closer to [Resnik 1997] than to
[Shapiro 1997].
21
Fine in contrast holds that the mathematician is referring to the (unique) in-
dependent arbitrary natural number [Fine 1985, p. 18]. Later on in the lecture,
Fine would add, she may introduce other arbitrary natural numbers that
depend on m.
Like Fine’s account, the view developed in this article imputes arbi-
trariness to the objects referred to. But it is nonetheless very different from
Fine’s. On my account, there are no independent arbitrary numbers. All
we can say is that all arbitrary numbers are correlated with each other in
complicated ways; there is no ontological priority of some over others.
If Fine is right, there is only one natural number that the mathemati-
cian’s use of ‘m’ can refer to: there is then no mystery about how the ref-
erence relation finds its target. Nonetheless, as Breckenridge & Magidor
observe, the mathematician could go on to say ”Now let n also be an ar-
bitrary natural number.” It is not clear in which sense n depends on m (or
vice versa) [Breckenridge & Magidor 2012, p. 391].
I conclude from this with Breckenridge & Magidor that if we take,
along with Fine, arbitrary numbers seriously, then there is more than one
candidate arbitrary natural number for our mathematician to be referring
to when she says ”Let m be a natural number”. Indeed, we have seen
that according to my account, there are many completely arbitrary natural
numbers. But then the question arises: in virtue of what does ‘m’ refer to
one arbitrary natural number rather than to another one?
When Breckenridge & Magidor claim that ‘m’ refers to some specific
natural number, they are faced with a similar question. In response, they
say that the reference of ‘m’ is a brute, unexplained semantic fact. There is
no explanation of why the mathematician refers to the number 172 (if she
does), rather than to the number 3, for instance. This forces them to deny
that reference supervenes on language use [Breckenridge & Magidor 2012,
p. 380].
The generic structuralist can take a similar line, and hold that the refer-
ence of ‘m’ to some arbitrary number is a brute semantic fact. But denying
the supervenience of reference on language use strikes many as a radical
claim.23 It might be more reasonable to hold that just as it is indetermi-
natewhether the term ‘i’ refers to one place in the structure of the complex
plane rather than to another,24 it is indeterminate to which completely ar-
23This claim is defended in [Kearns & Magidor 2012].
24The same holds for the term ‘−i’; but it is determinate that ‘i’ and ‘−i’ do not refer to
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bitrary number the term ‘m’ refers.
8 In closing
I have explored a new account of mathematical structure. All I can hope to
have achieved is to have articulated and defended this view to the extent
that readers are convinced that it deserves a hearing in the community of
philosophers of mathematics.
The focus of this article has been mainly on matters metaphysical, al-
though some attention was also payed to aspects of semantic reference.
Implications for mathematical epistemology have not been touched upon
at all. In particular, Benacerraf’s notorious access problem [Benacerraf 1970],
which can in some shape or form be raised for every form of mathematical
structuralism, was not addressed. This is not because I do not regard it as
an important problem; I just do not have space to discuss it in this article.
There are also many technical questions that arise naturally and need
to be addressed, such as: What is a suitable formal framework for rea-
soning about generic structures? Can we formally define notions of in-
distinguishability of arbitrary mathematical objects in a structure? These
questions and others like it are addressed in [Horsten & Speranski 2018].
the same place in the structure.
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